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1. INTRODUCTION
With increasing frequency, computer agents participate in
collaborative and competitive multiagent domains in which
humans reason strategically to make decisions. The deploy-
ment of computer agents in such domains requires that the
agents understand something about human behavior so that
they can interact successfully with people; the computer
agents must be sensitive to how people reason in strategic
settings as well as to the social utilities people employ to
inform their reasoning. To date, these design requirements
for computer agents have received relatively little attention.
To further research in this area, we are developing the Col-
ored Trails (CT) testbed [5], a congurable and extensible
open-source system for use by the research community at
large to investigate multiagent decision making.
CT is a situated multiagent game environment that can
be played by humans, computer agents, or a mixture of the
two. CT can involve any number of players and supports
one-shot and repeated games, games with simultaneous and
sequential decision making, and games with imperfect and
incomplete information. The players may act as individuals
or within teams. The game may place players (or teams) in
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competition or call for coordination and cooperation.
CT is parameterized to allow for increasing a scenario's
complexity along a number of dierent dimensions that may
inuence the performance of decision making approaches.
Thus, CT is a versatile framework for expressing and
studying a variety of decision-making scenarios.
CT is played on a board of colored squares. Each player
has a piece on the board as well as a collection of colored
chips that can be used to move the piece on the board.
Player pieces can move only to adjacent squares; to move
a piece to an adjacent square, a player must turn in a chip
of the same color as the square. One or more of the board
squares are designated as goal squares, and the objective of
each player is to move her piece as close as possible to (and
preferably onto) an appropriate goal square. A player may
lack certain chips needed to reach a goal square, but another
player may have these needed chips. Players may negotiate
with each other to exchange chips. Thus, the CT framework
provides a situated environment where each player has ob-
jectives (e.g., arrive at or come closer to a goal square), tasks
that must be performed to meet an objective (e.g., take a
step on a path to reach the goal), and resources (e.g., chips
that may be useful to move or trade with another player).
2. REPRESENTATIVE STUDIES WITH CT
The CT framework has been used for research on deci-
sion making in a variety of scenarios, with most scenarios
involving human-subjects trials. For example, Gal et al. [4]
investigate human reasoning in a two-player full-information
negotiation game. A model of human play is rst learned
from data, and then a computer agent is constructed that
formulates a best-reply to the human model. The agent
is deployed in subsequent human-subjects trials along with
other agents that play Nash equilibrium and Nash bargain-
ing strategies for the game. The computer agent that used
the human model outscored the game-theoretic agents as
well as other humans. In later work, Gal and Pfeer [3] con-
sider an iterated version of the two-player negotiation game
to investigate reciprocity in human play. This work mod-
els human reasoning in terms of both retrospective think-
ing about others' past behaviors and prospective predictionsabout future behavior. Results show that reasoning about
human reciprocity signicantly improves the accuracy of a
predictive model of human behavior as compared to alter-
native models that do not reason about reciprocity, or that
play various game theoretic equilibria.
Kamar and Grosz [7] use CT to investigate interruption
management. Their research aims to determine the circum-
stances under which a human will consent to being inter-
rupted by a computer agent in a multiagent task. Through
such modeling, they are able to construct a computer agent
that maximizes the expected outcome of an interruption;
thus, the agent is able to avoid costly and unproductive in-
terruptions of human work. Hendrix and Grosz [6] construct
a CT-inspired scenario involving only computer agents to in-
vestigate the eects of reputation. By varying the number
of agents, the distribution of agent abilities in the task sce-
nario, and the way reputation was used and reported, they
were able to describe how the ecacy of reputation hinged
on the particulars of the situation. Reputation was found
to be especially useful in the early stages of an interaction,
even when the reputation information was error prone.
Most recently, Ficici and Pfeer [1, 2] use CT to build a
three-player negotiation game where two of the players have
only partial information about each other's game state. This
game is used to investigate human strategic reasoning un-
der uncertainty [1]. Do people explicitly reason about other
players in the game? If so, do people also consider the possi-
ble states of other players for which only partial information
is known? A variety of models are learned from human data.
The most successful models are hierarchical and capture the
reasoning of the other players. Using these models, com-
puter agents are able to achieve human-level performance in
the game. The same game is used to investigate how human
beliefs about others aect strategic reasoning [2]. The mod-
els learned in this work are able to distinguish the eects of
an individual's preferences from her beliefs about another's
preferences. Results show that people have slightly incorrect
beliefs about others' preferences in this game.
The CT framework has been used in courses on multia-
gent systems at Harvard and Bar Ilan University. Research
groups from universities such as Bar Ilan and the University
of Melbourne have used and are currently using CT.
3. TECHNOLOGY
The Colored Trails platform has been developed through
funding from the NSF and DARPA. CT supports mixed
networks of interacting human and computer agents; to ac-
commodate such mixed networks, CT must operate as a dis-
tributed system. CT currently runs over local area networks
and will eventually run over the Web.
The CT system is currently in beta release and has been
published under the GNU open-source license on our web
site: www.eecs.harvard.edu/ai/ct. Those interested in
using CT can download source code, tutorial materials, and
our research papers. People can also submit feature requests
and join our CT mail list to receive announcements.
The CT testbed is designed to be extensible and cong-
urable to meet specic experimental needs. The core CT
system provides robust networking (via JMS), data logging,
and experiment management services. Aspects that are spe-
cic to particular experiments are left under the control of
the researcher. CT allows custom game logic to be imple-
mented through a dynamically loaded game conguration
class written by the experimenter; this class operates with
the server and provides the game designer with full access
to state information and the ability to monitor and react to
player communications. The experimenter can create cus-
tom message types to implement new types of inter-player
communication; for example, a message may concern an oer
to trade chips, a reply to an oer, or a request for informa-
tion (e.g., about the game state or about the reputation of
another player). The CT agent API allows the experimenter
to create a custom graphical user interface (GUI) as required
for human players; standard GUI components are provided.
For computer agents, the agent API provides easy access to
all aspects of the system.
4. DEMO DESCRIPTION
We will demonstrate the current beta version of our CT
framework as well as an older code base that was used in the
experiments described in Ficici and Pfeer [1, 2]. People will
be able to run sample CT scenarios implementing two- and
three-player negotiation games, as well as interact with the
computer agents that use models of human behavior learned
from human data [1].
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